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Comparative Impairment and Better
Law: Grand Illusions in the Conflict
of Laws*
By LEO KANOWITZ**
In Bernhard v. Harrah's Club,' the California Supreme Court
wholeheartedly embraced the comparative-impairment approach to the
resolution of a "true conflict," an approach that has since been fol-
lowed by the California Courts of Appeal in other cases.2 The princi-
pal doctrinal proponents of comparative-impairment analysis have
been Professor William Baxter3 of the Stanford Law School and Pro-
fessor Harold Horowitz4 of the UCLA Law School, although intima-
tions of such methodology had been previously adumbrated by
Professor David Cavers5 of Harvard.
Comparative-impairment theory builds upon the pioneering work6
* While this Article was at the press, the California Supreme Court decided Offshore
Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
A discussion and analysis of that decision appears in the author's postscript at the end of the
Article.
** Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. A.B.
1947, College of the City of New York; J.D. 1960, University of California, Berkeley; LL.M.
1967, J.S.D. 1969, Columbia University.
1. 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 859 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 138 Cal. Rptr. 838, hearing
granted, No. LA30820 (Aug. 4, 1977); Hall v. University of Nevada, 74 Cal. App. 3d 280,
141 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1977); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. App. 3d 501, 132
Cal. Rptr. 541 (1976).
3. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963).
4. Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in Caiyfomia-A Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 719 (1974).
5. See, ag., Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 732, 734 n.9 (1963).
6. Though suggestions of a governmental interest analysis had antedated Currie's
work, see, ag., New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914); H. KAMEs, PRINCIPLES
OF EQUITY (1960), Currie was the first commentator on the conflict of laws to elaborate a
systematic approach to the choice-of-law process based entirely on the principles of govern-
mental interest analysis. Currie's opus in this field consists of a series of articles, fourteen of
which appeared as separate chapters in his book, B. CUIuE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAws (1963) [hereinafter cited as SELECTED ESSAYS]. Two later articles ap-
peared only in legal periodicals. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CON-
of the late Brainerd Currie of the University of Chicago Law School.
Advocates of comparative impairment accept Currie's basic contribu-
tion to the resolution of the choice-of-law issue, namely that the initial
step in the process requires the identification of the governmental inter-
ests affected by the application or nonapplication of the laws of the
jurisdictions in contention. 7 Once those interests are identified, then,
as Currie has persuasively demonstrated, the forum cannot help but
conclude in a substantial number of cases that it is confronted by a
false conflict, that is, that the application of one state's law will advance
that state's interest without impairing the interest of any other state.8
Currie recognized, however, that the interests of two or more states
will often be directly implicated in the choice to be made, in which
event a true conflict is presented. Partly because of the drastic nature
of his proposed solution, Currie urged that, if an apparent true conflict
was presented, the forum, using the ordinary tools of statutory con-
struction and common-law interpretation, reexamine the content of its
own state's law. This reexamination would consider whether, by ac-
cording the domestic law a restrained and moderate interpretation, a
true conflict could be avoided. 9 He recognized, however, that even
after this second effort at identifying the policies and interests reflected
in the forum's law is completed, some true conflicts would remain. To
resolve them, Currie, rejecting a variety of other proposed solutions,
urged a rather straightforward and simple act: the application by the
forum of its own law.' 0
This solution was based in part upon Currie's premise that the fo-
rum has a natural inclination to apply its own law, because it does so in
TEMP. PROB. 754 (1963); Currie, Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A Rolefor
Congress, 1964 THE SuP. CT. Rav. 89.
7. More precisely, as stated by the California Supreme Court, explicating Currie's
method, in Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 581,522 P.2d 666, 670, 114 Cal. Rptr.
106, 110 (1977): "As the forum, California 'can only apply its own law' (Reich v. Purcell,
... [67 Cal. 2d] at p. 553, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31,432 P.2d at 727). When the forum undertakes to
resolve a choice-of-law problem presented to it by the litigants, it does not choose between
foreign law and its own law, but selects the appropriate rule of decision for the forum to
apply as its law to the case before it. (Reich v. Purcell, [67 Cal. 2d] at p. 533, 63 Cal. Rptr.
31, 432 P.2d 727)." (emphasis supplied).
8. Currie, Married Women's Contracts. 4 Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U.
CHI. L. REV. 227, 251 (1958), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS 77, 107.
9. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 754, 757 (1963).
Whether Currie intended the moderate and restrained interpretation to be applied to forum
law only, or to the law of the other state as well, does not clearly appear from his writings.
This ambiguity is examined infra at text following note 58 where various ways of reconciling
apparent inconsistencies in Currie's position on this point are suggested.
10. Id. at 758.
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the vast majority of cases heard, that is, in all cases entirely domestic in
character. ' 1
An even more important reason for Currie's advocacy of the appli-
cation of forum law to resolve a true conflict was his conviction that
neither state nor federal courts were equipped or authorized to make
the essentially political choice between two or more contending laws by
evaluating their respective worth' 2 or by determining the intensity with
which they were regarded by their respective jurisdictions. Such
choices, he suggested, were better left to the United States Congress,
13
acting under the authority of the full faith and credit clause' 4 of the
federal constitution, and with the normal operation of the political
process, such as committee hearings and debate, which generate the
"'legislative facts' on which alone an informed choice can rest."' 5
Despite growing judical acceptance of Currie's governmental-in-
terest analysis,16 courts, with rare exception,' 7 have been reluctant to
adopt his proposed method of resolving the true conflict. A leading
concern has been that, under Currie's proposal, the result of a case will
often vary with the forum, with the consequent promotion of forum-
shopping whenever jurisdiction over the defendants in the action can
be obtained in more than one forum.' 8
11. Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 964, 1027
(1958), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS 3,75: "The normal business of courts being the adju-
dication of domestic cases, and the normal tendency of lawyers and judges being to think in
terms of domestic law, the normal expectation should be that the rule of decision will be
supplied by the domestic law as a matter of course."
12. Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28 U.
CHI. L. REv. 258, 273 (1961), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS 584, 602.
13. Id.
14. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1: "Full faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may
by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof."
15. Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28 U.
Cm. L. Rv. 258, 272 (1961), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS 584, 600.
16. As of 1977, it has been noted, 26 states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto
Rico had discarded the place-of-wrong rule as the sole choice of law rule for torts in favor of
one based essentially on governmental interests analysis. Weintraub, The Future of Choice
of Lawfor Torts: What Principles Should be Preferred?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Spring
1977, at 146-47.
17. See, ag., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).
18. Forum selection by the plaintiff has been characterized by a Currie critic as a
purely fortuitous circumstance, devoid of normative content which has the effect of casually
defeating "now the one and now the other policy" of the states whose laws are in contention.
Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. Rnv. 1, 19 (1963). Currie im-
plicitly recognized this, but said: "Paradoxically, the problem is insoluble with the resources
of conflict-of-laws law ... ." Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-
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Moreover, the prospect of one state, after having decided that a
true conflict is present, boldly asserting its own interest, without at-
tempting to weigh or evaluate the interest of another state whose own
law is potentially applicable, has seemed particularly discomfiting. 19
Notwithstanding the sovereignty of the fifty states, automatically opt-
ing for one's own state's law even when it truly conflicts with the law of
another state struck many judges and commentators 20 as unseemly con-
duct for courts functioning in a federal system composed of fifty united
states.
Concern with discouraging forum-shopping and its concomitant
disuniformity of results, and revulsion against the appearance of self-
ishness that would be displayed by state courts always resolving true
conflicts by applying their own laws, explain the impulse to devise
more sophisticated, and less obviously self-serving, ways of resolving
the true conflict. Comparative impairment joins the "better law" ap-
proach as a recent example of efforts to achieve this goal.2' Examina-
Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 260 (1958), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS 76, 117.
The ultimate solution, he insisted, was to be found in congressional action under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause. 25 U. CHI. L. Rav. 266-68, reprintedin SELECTED ESSAYS 125-27.
In reply to Currie's suggestion that the evils of forum-shopping have been exaggerated, Cur-
re, Survival ofActions. Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict ofLaws, 10 STAN. L.
REV. 205, 244-45 (1958), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS 128, 168-69, Professor Baxter cites
the following "social costs" of forum-shopping: 1) The encouragement of "early filing"
which is "often detrimental to negotiated settlements." 2) "The forum selected frequently is
not the most economical for either party." 3) "Jurisdictional disputes are engendered be-
cause personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the selected forum may be dubious." Bax-
ter, Choice ofLaw and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1963). With regard
to the first point, it should be noted that there are many other incentives for early filing, e.g.,
the wish to be perceived by the fact-trier as a plaintiff rather than a counter-claimant.
Moreover, in many cases, filing a lawsuit can facilitate rather than hamper negotiated settle-
ments. As for the second and third points, the potential problems cited by Professor Baxter
can and do occur without regard to forum-shopping.
19. Under Currie's proposed method, the interest of the "other state" is ignored only
after it is determined that a true conflict is present. But that interest may be taken into
account in determining whether the conflict between that state's interest and that of the
forum is true or false, real or merely apparent. In Currie's words: "[D]elineation of the
scope of a state's interest is a task of judicial statesmanship, and. . . a court may be well
advised to consider the conflict with foreign interests that may result from a too selfish and
provincial determination." Currie, The Verdict ofQuiescent Years. Mr. Hill and the Conflict
ofLaws, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 258, 265 (1961), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS 584, 592 (em-
phasis supplied).
20. See Hill, Governmental Interest Analysis and the Conflict oLaws-A Reply to Pro-
/essor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. Rav. 463, 470-72 n.45 (1960).
21. Other recent examples, examination of which I am leaving for another day, include
Professor Cavers' "principles of preference," see D.F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-oF-LAw PROC-
Ess (1965), and the recent "rules" approach of the New York Court of Appeals in Neumeier
v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
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tion of these two methodologies reveals, however, that their vaunted
superiority over the Currie prescription is more illusory than real, that
they create more problems than they solve, and that Currie's analysis
and proposed resolution of the true conflict, as explicated hereafter,
remain as compellingly valid today as when originally proposed.
Comparative Impairment
Bernhard v. Harrah's Club
The facts in Bernhard v. Harrah's Club22 were relatively straight-
forward. The defendant, Harrali's Club, a Nevada hotel and gambling
casino located close to that state's border with California, advertised
for California customers. Responding, a California couple drove to
the Club where, during their stay, they were served alcoholic beverages
even after they had become obviously too drunk to drive safely. After
the couple, still drunk, had left Nevada on their return trip and were
traveling on a California highway, their car crossed a center line in that
state, striking and severely injuring the plaintiff, who was riding a
motorcycle.
The California Supreme Court, basing its decision on common-
law and statutory grounds, had previously held that tavern owners in
California were civilly liable to the injured party under such circum-
stances.23 By contrast, Nevada had refused to impose such liability
either on common-law grounds or on the basis of a Nevada statute
making it a crime to sell alcoholic beverages to a person who is
drunk.2
4
In Bernhard, a suit by the injured California motorcyclist against
the Nevada tavern owner, the California Supreme Court concluded
that this was the first case it had confronted which involved a true con-
flict of state interests. The true conflict reflected, on the one hand, a
California policy to protect California residents injured in California
by intoxicated drivers and, on the other, a Nevada policy to protect
Nevada tavern owners from "ruinous" civil liability "every time they
poured a drink."5 The court held that the method to be applied in
resolving a true conflict was that of comparative impairment: "[True
conflicts should be resolved by applying the law of the state whose in-
22. 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976).
23. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971).
24. Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969).
25. 16 Cal. 3d at 318, 546 P.2d at 722, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
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terest would be more impaired if its law were not applied. ' 26 The
opinion noted that the "core of [this method's] rationale was applied by
Justice Traynor in his opinion for this court in People v. One 1953 Ford
Victoria."' 27 The court concluded that use of the comparative-impair-
ment method in the case at hand should result in the application of
California law because Nevada, having already provided for criminal
liability for tavern owners who served alcoholic beverages to intoxi-
cated customers, would suffer less impairment to its policy than would
California by the nonapplication of its rule with respect to civil liabil-
ity. The result, for the time being at least, was to be limited to the
Bernhard-type situation, in which the tavern owner's premises were so
close to the California border, and California customers had been so
actively solicited via advertising that the defendant had "put itself at
the heart of California's regulatory interest, namely to prevent tavern
keepers from selling alcoholic beverages to obviously intoxicated per-
sons who are likely to act in California in the intoxicated state." 28 In
these circumstances, the increased exposure of such businesses to liabil-
ity "is a foreseeable and coverable business expense."
29
The first observation that Bernhard evokes is that its result is pre-
cisely the same as the one that would have been reached had the court
simply followed Currie's prescription to resolve a true conflict by ap-
plying forum law. The comparative-impairment technique, neverthe-
less, suffers from serious defects not present in Currie's method.
Unlike Currie's method, the comparative-impairment technique can
lead to the forum applying the law of the "other state" in the case of a
true conflict.30 Indeed, this has already been done, since Bernhard, by
the California Court of Appeal in Offshore Rental Company, Inc. v.
Continental Oil Company,31 discussed hereafter. However, as Currie
has noted, it "is no part of the duty of a court to subordinate domestic
interests to those of a foreign state."
'32
A serious defect of the comparative-impairment method is that,
though the Bernhard court links it to the process of "moderate and
restrained interpretation" that Currie advocated to avoid finding a true
26. Id. at 320, 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
27. Id. at 321, 546 P.2d at 724, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 220 (citing People v. One 1953 Ford
Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957)).
28. 16 Cal. 3d at 322, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
29. Id. at 323, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
30. See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.
31. 70 Cal. App. 3d 485, 138 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1977); see text accompanying notes 82-88
infra C
32. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 754, 758 (1963).
[Vol. 30
conflict,33 the actual method employed by the court to determine which
state's policy would be more impaired by the nonapplication of its law
is much more complicated than the one Currie proposed for the earlier
stage of the process. This defect leads to the greater danger, on the one
hand, of unconscious or conscious manipulation of the data by the
court and, on the other, of overlooking significant factors that should
be considered even under the method's own premises. Moreover, the
assertion by the Bernhard court that the "core" of the comparative-
impairment rationale was applied by Justice Traynor in One 1953 Ford
Victoria misconstrues what was done in that case.
34
The most serious defect, however, in the comparative-impairment
method is that, notwithstanding the court's protestations that it differs
qualitatively from a weighing process "in the sense of determining
which conflicting law manifested the 'better' or the 'worthier' social
policy on the specific issue,"' 35 the comparative-impairment technique
inevitably implicates the kind of value judgments which Currie so ef-
fectively demonstrated to be beyond the competence of state or federal
courts, a basic principle conceded by the court36 and scholars advocat-
ing the method's use.37
The Bernhard Rationale
The heart of the Bernhard decision appears to lie in two formula-
tions:*l) that Nevada's criminalization of the type of conduct engaged
in by the defendant indicates that the state of Nevada would not be
greatly offended or injured, or its interests greatly impaired, if that de-
33. 16 Cal. 3d at 320, 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
34. See text accompanying notes 46-52 infra.
35. 16 Cal. 3d at 320, 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219. "'[The process] can
accurately be described as... accommodation of conflicting state policies, as a problem of
allocating domains of law-making power in multi-state contexts-limitations on the reach of
state policies as distinguished from evaluating the wisdom of those- policies....
[E]mphasis is placed on the appropriate scope of conflicting state policies rather than on the
"quality" of those policies......' (Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California-a
Restatement, supra, 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rlv. 719, 753; see also Baxter, Choice of Law and the
Federal System, supra, 16 Stan.L.Rev. 1, 18-19.)" Id. at 320-21, 546 P.2d at 723-24, 128
Cal. Rptr. at 219-20.
36. "'An attempted balancing of conflicting state policies [in the sense of 'better' or
'worthier' social policy on the specific issue] is difficult to justify in the context of a federal
system in which, within constitutional limits, states are empowered to mold their policies as
they wish." Id. at 320, 546 P.2d at 723-24, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 219-20 (quoting Horowitz, The
Law of Choice of Law in California-A Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 719, 753 (1974)).
37. Horowitz, he Law of Choice of Law in Calfornia-A Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L.
Ray. 719, 753 (1974). See also Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 5-6 (1963).
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fendant were subjected to civil liability in California, despite Nevada's
previous determination not to subject such defendants to this type of
liability; and 2) that the increased economic exposure of such busi-
nesses is a "foreseeable and coverable business expense."
Though both notions are subsumed by the court under a common
rubric of comparative-impairment analysis, it is clear that the second
point, the foreseeable and coverable business expense, more properly
relates to the question of whether the defendant would be subjected to
unfair surprise by being held liable under the California common law,
rather than to whether the extent, nature, or intensity of the Nevada
interest is lessened by the presence of this factor. This second point is
akin to the question before the California Supreme Court in People v.
One 1953 Ford Victoria,38 discussed below, 39 wherein the court deter-
mined that, in part, because of the probability of unfair surprise to the
out-of-state party in that case, the scope of the California statute in-
volved therein did not extend to the situation before it.
Thus, had the imposition of liability upon Nevada tavern owners
been analyzed by the Bernhard court as creating an unforeseeable risk,
this imposition of liability would not have been proof of a stronger
interest on Nevada's part; rather, it might merely have led to a conclu-
sion, under the One 1953 Ford Victoria rationale (which is ultimately
Currie's "moderate and restrained interpretation"), that the California
interest did not extend to this kind of situation. Indeed, the assertion
in Bernhard that its determination was limited to its own facts4° sug-
gests that, were the defendant's club located at the point in Nevada
furthest away from California, and had it never advertised for Califor-
nia customers, the California Supreme Court might not hold it liable
under the California law. Yet Nevada's interest under those circum-
stances would be neither stronger nor weaker, neither more nor less
intense, than it was in the Bernhard case itself. The court's discussion
of the foreseeability of the risk of liability under California law, there-
fore, has no relevance to determining the nature of Nevada's interest in
preserving the immunity from civil liability of that state's tavern own-
ers in a Bernhard-type situation.
38. 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957).
39. See text accompanying note 47 infra.
40. "We need not, and accordingly do not here determine the outer limits to which
California's policy should be extended, for it appears clear to us that it must encompass
defendant, who. . . has put itself at the heart of California's regulatory interest .... "16
Cal. 3d at 322, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
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Furthermore, the fact that Nevada criminalized the kind of con-
duct engaged in by the Bernhard defendant does not lead ineluctably
to the conclusion that Nevada's interest would be less impaired than
California's by the nonapplication of the Nevada rule of decision, at
least not if the full scope of the Nevada interest is taken into account,
which the California Supreme Court failed to do. Had that been done,
the following factors would have been discerned. First, Nevada had
repealed its criminal statute in 1973, a date falling between the time of
the accident which spawned Bernhard and the decision in that case.
41
Second, as one commentator has observed: "If Nevada protects its tav-
erns from liability to its own residents, it has an even greater interest in
preventing their liability to out-of-state residents." 42 Third, and per-
haps most important, despite Nevada's criminalization of certain bar-
tender behavior, it had a strong, intense, and abiding interest in
protecting its local clubs and casinos from civil liability for such behav-
ior. A proliferation of Bernhard-type suits can lead to enormous
money damages in the case of uninsured or self-insured clubs or casi-
nos, or substantially increased insurance premiums for those that are
insured. This additional monetary exposure could seriously impair the
financial well-being of Nevada's clubs and casinos which are among
that state's most important economic resources. By contrast, while a
criminal prosecution of a Nevada tavern owner can lead to a conviction
and the expense of defending the action, it could also result in the de-
fendant being placed on probation or being assessed a moderate fine.
In the event of the imposition of such a lesser penalty, the consequent
harm to Nevada's interests in that event would be substantially less
than in the case of civil liability.
In short, Bernhard's intimation that, because Nevada criminalized
the act of a Nevada bartender serving alcoholic beverages to an obvi-
ously intoxicated customer, the state was relatively unconcerned about
the imposition of civil liability upon that bartender by another state for
the same conduct, is unpersuasive.
In the light of that fact, there can be little doubt that, had the
Bernhard case been brought in a Nevada court (and had that court
adopted the comparative-impairment method), the ultimate result
would have been diametrically opposed to the one reached by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court. What happens, therefore, to the vaunted supe-
riority of comparative impairment over Currie's prescription to apply
41. Ch. 604, § 8, 1973 Nev. Stats. 1062 (repealing ch. 151, 1911 Nev. Stats. 313, as
amended by NEv. REv. STAT. § 202.100 (1967)).
42. Note, Conflict ofLaws, 65 CALiF. L. RaV. 290, 296 (1977).
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forum law to resolve a true conflict? Barring an occasional aberrant
decision in which the forum is overcome by an excess of altruism or
shortsightedness, 43 comparative impairment is just as likely to casually
defeat "now the one and now the other policy"' 44 of the states whose
laws are in contention, depending upon which state happens to be the
forum. The greater danger, however, is that courts adopting the com-
parative-impairment method are likely to delude themselves into be-
lieving that they are applying value-free, objective criteria to resolve
the true conflict. They thereby unwittingly obscure the political act
such decisions necessarily involve, and further delay resolution of the
choice-of-law problem by the only body capable and authorized to re-
solve it: the United States Congress.
45
Justice Traynor's Rationale in One 1953 Ford Victoria
The suggestion in Bernhard46 that "the core of [the comparative-
impairment] rationale was applied by Justice Traynor in. . . People v.
One 1953 Ford Victoria,"' 47 originally advanced by Professor
Horowitz,48 also appears open to question.
In One 1953 Ford Victoria, the California Supreme Court dealt
with a proceeding to forfeit an automobile used for the unlawful trans-
portation of narcotics. The car had been purchased in Texas where the
buyer had executed a note and chattel mortgage for the unpaid
purchase price. Without the mortgagee's knowledge or consent and in
violation of the mortgage agreement, the buyer drove the car to Cali-
fornia where he used it to transport marijuana. The pertinent Califor-
nia statutes made it clear that there was to be no forfeiture of the
interest of an innocent mortgagee, that is, a person who had investi-
gated the buyer's character and did not know that the car was to be
used for such an unlawful purpose. Texas had no such statute, and the
mortgagee had not conducted the reasonable investigation of the mort-
43. See text accompanying notes 82-88 infra.
44. See note 18 supra.
45. Recognizing with Currie that Congress has not to date shown any enthusiasm for
this task, see Currie, Married Women's Contracts A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25
U. CHi. L. REv. 227, 267 (1958), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS 77, 126, one must still note
that, to the extent the illusion is created that the choice-of-law problem is being solved by
the courts, Congress will have that much less incentive to begin dealing with the problem
itself.
46. 16 Cal. 3d at 321, 546 P.2d at 724, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
47. People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957).
48. Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California-A Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 719, 749-50 (1974).
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gagor's character called for by the California law. Commenting upon
this situation, the court in Bernhard stated:
It was clear that Texas had an interest in seeing that valid security
interests created upon the lawful purchase of automobiles in Texas
be enforceable and recognized. California had an interest in con-
trolling the transportation of narcotics. Each interest was at stake in
the case, since the chattel mortgage had been validly created in Texas
and the car was used to transport narcotics in California. The cru-
cial question confronting the court was whether the 'reasonable in-
vestigation' required by statute of a California mortgagee applied to
the Texas mortgagee. Employing what was in substance a 'compar-
ative impairment' approach, the court answered the question in the
negative . . . [because California could still forfeit the mortgagor's
interest in the car and the Legislature had] not made plain that 'rea-
sonable investigation' of the purchaser is such an essential element of
innocence that it must be made even by an out-of-state mortgagee
although such mortgagee could not reasonably be expected to make
such investigation.49
Certain problems emerge from the court's description of what had
been done in One 1953 Ford Victoria. Initially, by characterizing the
subject in which California had an interest as that of "controlling the
transportation of narcotics," the court begs the question. If that is in-
deed the subject of the interest, then Bernhard can be read as intimat-
ing that One 1953 Ford Victoria presented a true conflict which,
implicitly, was resolved by application of a comparative-impairment
technique. This would contradict the court's assertion that Bernhard
was the first case presenting a true conflict to come before it5O and
would contradict the apparent holding in One 1953 Ford Victoria itself,
that is, that the statute involved in that case could not reasonably be
interpreted to apply in the given multi-state context.51 Furthermore, as
will be seen below, even if it could be plausibly argued that a compara-
tive-impairment technique was employed in Ford Victoria, this would
not necessarily justify its use in the Bernhard-type situation itself.
A better way to characterize the subject of the California interest
in One 1953 Ford Victoria is to limit it to the specific situation before
the court, that is, not the general category of transporting narcotics, but
the specific category of transportation of narcotics in California by a
person who had purchased the car from a Texas seller who took a
mortgage without any reason to know of or comply with the California
requirement of a "reasonable investigation." The specific inquiry in
Ford Victoria was directed to whether the California interest extended
49. 16 Cal. 3d at 321-22, 546 P.2d at 724, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
50. Id. at 319, 546 P.2d at 722, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 218.
51. 48 Cal. 2d at 598, 311 P.2d at 482.
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to the type of situation before the court in that case. More precisely,
the court was concerned with whether the California Legislature, which
created a California interest by enacting a statute that imposed a duty
of 'reasonable investigation,' intended that interest to extend to that
situation.5 2
Replying to that concern, the court in One 1953 Ford Victoria took
account of the element of unfair surprise that would confront the Texas
mortgagee as well as the fact that the essential purposes of the Califor-
nia legislation still would be largely served even if this particular mort-
gagee were not required to forfeit his interest in the automobile in
question; in effect, it concluded that the California interest did not
reach this type of situation.
This interpretation of One 1953 Ford Victoria presents a qualita-
tively different conclusion from the one, implicit in the court's discus-
sion in Bernhard, that the California interest would be less impaired
than Texas' by the nonapplication of its law to this situation.
"Moderate and Restrained Interpretation" and Comparative
Impairment
Professor Horowitz, one of the principal proponents of the com-
parative-impairment technique, has described the comparative-impair-
ment method as an
accommodation of conflicting state policies, as a problem of allocat-
ing domains of law-making power in multi-state con-
texts-limitations on the reach of state policies as distinguished from
evaluating the wisdom of those policies .... [E]mphasis is placed
on the appropriate scope of conflicting state policies rather than on
the 'quality' of those policies .... 53
52, Professor Ratner would, I suspect, dispute this formulation. In his view: "Identifi-
cation of such underlying policies [that the state has adopted to promote the welfare of its
residents] focuses not on the motives or intentions of legislators who enacted the statute or of
judges who developed the common law rule but on community purposes or goals as dis-
closed by the problems that evoked the rule, its function in the network of existing commu-
nity arrangements, and the beneficial consequences to the community of its implementation."
Ratner, Choice ofLaw: Interest Analysis and Cost-Contribution, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 817, 819
(1974). My problem with this formulation is that it proceeds from natural-law jurispruden-
tial premises and assumes that a state's interest in regulating a subject precedes its positive
regulation by a court or legislature of that state. Once the need for positive creation of the
state interest is recognized, however, it becomes clear that the entity creating the interest can
also limit its reach or scope, and that ascertaining its intentions in this regard is central to
any moderate or restrained interpretation of its rule.
53. 16 Cal. 3d at 320-21, 546 P.2d at 724, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 220 (quoting Horowitz, The




At first blush, the comparative-impairment technique thus seems
to resemble what the California Supreme Court did in One 1953 Ford
Victoria and in Bernkrant v. Powler5 4 where, by applying a moderate
and restrained interpretation, it read the California statutes before it as
creating a limited California interest, thereby avoiding a true conflict.
If the techniques are the same, one might ask, why proceed in any case
to the last step? Why not simply decide that there is a false conflict,
since the California interest does not extend to the situation before the
court, thereby avoiding the necessity to resolve a true conflict?
Part of the answer lies in the fact that it would be extremely diffi-
cult to find that the California interest does not extend to a Bernhard-
type situation, where serious injury has been inflicted on a Californian
in California as a proximate result of the activity of a defendant who,
under the circumstances, would not be unfairly surprised by the resul-
tant liability. The more important part of the answer is that, though
the Bernhard court appears to recognize that Currie's moderate and
restrained interpretation is to be applied to forum law only and not to
the law of the other state,55 and purports to apply that principle to the
case at hand,5 6 still, by holding that "the policy of this state [California]
would be more significantly impaired if such rule [California's] were
not applied,"57 the court impliedly subjects the law of the other state,
Nevada, to the same type of restrained and moderate interpretation.
That the court does this appears even more clearly from its determina-
tion that, since Nevada already criminalizes this type of bartender-be-
havior, Nevada's interests would not be greatly impaired by subjecting
these same bartenders to civil liability under Bernhard-type circum-
stances, despite the rejection of such liability by the Nevada Supreme
Court in an entirely domestic case.
54. 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961). Bernkrant held that the
California Statute of Frauds did not extend to an oral agreement concluded in Nevada to
make a will cancelling a debt that remained on the purchase price of Nevada property,
although the promisor may have been domiciled in California when the agreement was
made.
55. "Currie suggested that when under the governmental interest approach a prelimi-
nary analysis reveals an apparent conflict of interest upon the forum's assertion of its own
rule of decision, the forum should re-examine its policy to determine if a more restrained
interpretation of it is more appropriate." 16 Cal. 3d at 320, 546 P.2d at 723, 128 Cal. Rptr.
at 219 (emphasis supplied).
56. "Therefore, upon re-examining the policy underlying California's rule of decision
and giving such policy a more restrained interpretation for the purpose of this case... we
conclude that California has an important and abiding interest in applying its rule of deci-
sion to the case at bench ... " 16 Cal. 3d at 323, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221
(emphasis supplied).
57. 16 Cal. 3d at 323, 546 P.2d at 725, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22.
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In other words, earlier California cases, such as One 1953 Ford
Victoria, and perhaps Bernkrant v. Fowler as well, in effect applied
Currie's "moderate and restrained interpretation" to limit the extent of
a governmental interest only with respect to the interest of the forum
state. In each case, a statute was read as limiting the scope of the Cali-
fornia interest, without ever considering the possibility of limiting the
scope of the interest of the other state. By contrast, the essence of the
comparative-impairment technique, as practiced by the court in
Bernhard and as advocated by Professors Baxter and Horowitz, is to
permit such limitation of the scope of a state's interest to be ascertained
not only with respect to the forum but to the other state as well.
'Moderate and Restrained Interpretation" of Foreign Law
Currie's writing itself, it must be conceded, appears to contain con-
tradictory statements as to whether forum law only, or the law of the
other state as well, are to be subjected to his "moderate and restrained
interpretation. s58 Examination of these statements reveals, however,
that they can be reconciled.
In a number of instances, Currie clearly implies that the only law
to which the forum can apply a moderate and restrained interpretation
in an effort to avoid a true conflict is the law of its own state. Thus, at
one point, he states:
[T]o assert a conflict between the interests of the forum and the for-
eign state is a serious matter, the mere fact that a suggested broad
conception of a local interest will create conflict with that of a for-
eign state is a sound reason why the conception should be reexam-
ined, with a view to a more moderate and restrained interpretation
both of the policy and of the circumstances in which it must be ap-
plied to effectuate theforummr' legitimate purpose.
59
The same notion is implied in the following statement by Currie:
"[T]hough the function is essentially the same, there is an important
difference between construing domestic law with moderation in order
to avoid conflict with aforeign interest and its holding that the foreign
58. Examples of disparate readings of Currie's intentions in this regard may be found
in Note, Conflict ofLaws, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 290, 293 (1977) ("Even though an apparent true
conflict exists, it may nevertheless be resolved by a more restrained interpretation of the
forum state's interests.") and Note, After Hurtado and Bernhard- Interest Analysis and the
Search for a Consistent Theoryfor Choice-of-Law Cases, 29 STAN. L. REV. 127, 131 n.24
(1976) ("A more moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or interest of one state
or the other may avoid the conflict.") (quoting Currie).




interest is paramount. '60 In discussing the unavoidable true conflict
situation, Currie states: "Analysis reveals a conflict of interests that
cannot be avoided despite reconsideration with the utmost good will
and moderation."
61
Use of the term "good will" in this context casts much light on the
probable meaning of "moderate and restrained" interpretation of a
state's policy and interest; it suggests very strongly that Currie is talking
about a forum using these qualities of "good will," "restraint," and
"moderation" in interpreting the policy and interest reflected in its own
state's law. "Good will" can hardly be said to be implicated in the
forum's determination that the law of another state, which is appar-
ently applicable, does not apply after all.
Thus, one interpretation--the most convincing one, I submit--of
what Currie means by a moderate and restrained interpretation of do-
mestic law to avoid conflict with a foreign interest is that the forum
court interpret only its own law in that manner.
Elsewhere, however, Currie seems to say that the technique is to be
employed with respect to the policies and interests of any state whose
laws are in contention. Thus, he suggests that one class of cases are
"those in which it appears that each state would be constitutionally jus-
tified in asserting an interest, but on reflection conflict is avoided by a
moderate definition of the policy or interest of one state or the other."62
Similarly, in a 1964 summary of his method, prepared by Currie,63
he states: "In cases where the court finds an apparent conflict between
the interests of the two states it should reconsider. A more moderate
and restrained interpretation of the policy or interest of one state or the
other may avoid the conflict."
Can these apparently inconsistent prescriptions be harmonized?
One way would be to read them together to produce the following rule:
If the other state has previously construed its own laws restrictively, the
forum may take that interpretation into account in determining the na-
ture of the other state's policy or interest reflected in that state's law;
but, barring such an earlier construction by the other state of its own
law, the forum is limited in applying a restrained or moderate interpre-
tation of law to its own law only.
The illustration that comes immediately to mind involves the fre-
60. Id. at 759.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 763 (emphasis supplied).
63. E. CHEATHAM, E. GRSWOLD, W. REESE & M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON THE CoNFLICr OF LAWS 523-24 (6th ed. 1971).
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quently discussed uses of renvoi under an interest analysis.64 Thus, the
forum may decide that both it and the other state have an interest in
the application of their own laws to the issue at hand. Upon closer
examination, however, the court may determine that the other state had
previously decided, pursuant to an interest analysis, that despite its in-
terest in applying its law to this issue when it involved only domestic
elements, it would defer to the law of another jurisdiction in a multi-
state case. If so, the forum can then say with certainty that, notwith-
standing the apparent conflict, there is in fact no true conflict. This
will be based in part upon a moderate and restrained interpretation of
the other state's law, previously charted by that other state's courts.
This earlier determination by the other state would indicate its
lack of real interest in the situation at hand, which may be relied upon
by the forum when it engages in a "more moderate and restrained in-
terpretation of the policy or interest of one state or the other." If, how-
ever, the other state had not previously referred the matter to the law of
a third state, or if the other state had not adopted interest-analysis at
all, but had adhered instead to the jurisdiction-selecting rules of the
First Restatement of the Conflict of Laws,65 it would be inappropriate
for the forum court to engage in a restrained and moderate interpreta-
tion for the other state. The danger, of course, is that if the forum did
so interpret the law of the other state under such circumstances, its de-
termination could turn out to be more enlightened, more restrained,
and reflective of more good will, than would have been a determina-
tion made by the other state's courts themselves.
To be sure, the earlier stages of Currie's governmental interests
analysis call for the identification of the interests of the other state as
well as that of the forum. It is one thing to say, however, as the courts
have done in cases applying interest analysis, that there are certain
obvious instances in which the "other state" has no interest but the
forum does, or vice versa, thereby revealing a false conflict. 66 It is
quite another thing for the forum, after it finds an apparent conflict
between the interests of the two jurisdictions, to subject the other state's
law, as well as its own, to an exquisite analysis based on "moderation,"
"restraint," and "good will," with an eye toward determining whether
64. See, e.g., Currie, The Distinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 754,
784-85 (1963); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 53-58 (1971).
65. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 (1934).
66. See, e.g., Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967);
Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
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the apparent interest of the other state is not a real interest after all.67
There is much to be said, then, for reading Currie's prescription
for a moderate and restrained interpretation of policies and interests,
after an apparent conflict has been discerned, as being limited to the
forum's own law; or, if the law of the other state is also subjected to
such an interpretation, to only those situations where the other state's
law has already received such an interpretation by its own courts.68
If, as is suggested, this is the best reading of Currie's prescription,
then it is clear that when Bernhard subjected the law of Nevada to
what was essentially Currie's moderate and restrained interpretation, it
was fundamentally at odds with what Currie himself had contem-
plated. Further, to find "the core" of the comparative-impairment
technique in One 1953 Ford Victoria, as the Bernhard court purporied
to do, was to infuse that case with more than it actually stood for, since
One 1953 Ford Victoria limited the scope of California law only, and
not that of any other state.
Moreover, even if the Currie formulae can be read as permitting
the forum to subject the other state's law to a moderate and restrained
interpretation, without the benefit of such an earlier interpretation by the
other state's courts, it would seem that, at the very least, the forum
would have to make such an interpretation as the courts of the other
state would themselves do, that is, to perceive the policies and interests
67. On "real interests," see Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to Choice of
Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 181, 223 (1977).
68. That Currie's prescription may have been so understood by the California Supreme
Court is not negated by any of its earlier decisions applying governmental interest-analysis.
For example, Hurtado v. Superior Court, II Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106
(1974), held that the "other state," Mexico, though it limited damages for wrongful death,
had no interest in applying this limitation against a California defendant, since the purpose
of the limitation was to protect Mexican defendants. But this conclusion was not the result
of a moderate and restrained interpretation of Mexican law; on the contrary, it was an
obvious construction. It was, therefore, consistent with the thesis advanced in the text.
Similarly, in Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551,.432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967), Califor-
nia was a disinterested forum, but the court held that the Missouri limit on wrongful death
damages did not reflect any interest in protecting non-Missouri defendants such as the one
in that case. It therefore applied the law of Ohio, which was the plaintiffs domicile and
which corresponded with California law in not limiting wrongful death damages. But
again, the reading of the Missouri interest was not the result of a moderate and restrained
interpretation of that state's law, rather, it was an obvious interpretation of the purpose of
Missouri law and the interests reflected in it--to protect Missouri defendants against exces-
sive wrongful death damage awards. And, in both People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48
Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957), and Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12
Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961), the court subjected only the California law to a moderate and re-
strained interpretation (though it did not use that terminology) and not the law of the other
states in those cases.
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69
Thus, it would be inappropriate under such circumstances for the
forum to subject the other state's interest to a moderate and restrained
interpretation if the other state has rejected governmental interests
analysis and adheres to more traditional jurisdiction-selection rules.
Similarly, although the other state may have previously adopted an in-
terest analysis, if that state's earlier decisions reveal a consistent rejec-
tion of the use of a restrained and moderate interpretation of any of the
states' policies and interests in contention to resolve apparent conflicts,
the forum would hardly be justified in deciding that a moderate and
restrained interpretation of that other state's law discloses that the other
state does not in fact have an interest in the application of its law to the
case at hand.
Finally, even if the other state has both adopted an interest analy-
sis and purported to recognize that apparent conflicts may be deter-
mined to be false conflicts by use of a restrained and moderate
interpretation, the forum should still not decide that the other state has
no real interest, if the other state has consistently held, following such
69. Courts often interpret the laws of other jurisdictions when there is no choice-of-law
problem to be resolved, or at least not a very difficult one, and, at least in modem times, do
this as that other jurisdiction's courts would do. Thus the federal courts, in Erie-type situa-
tions, will interpret state laws. While the mere difficulty of interpreting state law is not a
sufficient reason for a federal court not to proceed with its duty under its jurisdictional
grant, Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), still, if state law is difficult to
ascertain or ambiguous and if a constitutional decision may thereby be avoided, the federal
court is required to abstain in order to give the state courts themselves the opportunity to
provide a definitive clarification of the state law's meaning. See, e.g., England v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). While the "meaning" of state law is
often derivable by construing statutory language or examining its legislative history, or
parsing the reasoning of state court judges in dealing with cognate legal principles, these
processes inevitably implicate some exploration of state policy and interests. The policy of
the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970), if not that of the federal constitution,
require the concerned states themselves to explicate the nature and extent of their policies
and interests with respect to the content of laws that might have previously been unclear
even with respect to the scope of their internal operation. Similarly, if a forum's only con-
tact with a transaction that is the subject of a suit is that it is the forum, it may not apply its
own substantive law to resolve the suit. See Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397
(1930). Under such circumstances, it may also have to interpret the meaning of an ambigu-
ous legal principle of a state whose law is admittedly applicable to the case before it. When
it does this, however, it is usually explicit in interpreting that principle as the judges of the
state in which the principle operates would have done, ie., to put itself in the shoes of those
judges, just as federal courts do when deciding unsettled questions of state law in Erie-type
situations. See, e.g., Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., 149 F.2d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 1945).
In both instances, the forum defers to a view of the policy and interests of the "other state"
that is entertained by the judges of that other state; it does not attempt to impose its own
view of the other state's policies and interests when it does this.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [V/ol. 30
analysis, that its own interests were not only apparent, but real. Such
consistency would indicate that, despite the lip service paid to the prin-
ciple of enlightened altruism, in practice the other state's courts are ex-
tremely (perhaps justifiably) reluctant to resolve any doubts about its
own state's interests in applying its own law. If, as suggested above, an
alternative reading of Currie permits the forum to engage in a moder-
ate and restrained interpretation only if it is willing to decide the ques-
tion as the other state's courts would do, that principle would be clearly
violated were the forum court to ignore consistent self-serving results
in, and purport to be more altruistic than, the other state's courts.
If this reading of Currie's prescription were adopted, it would dif-
fer markedly from the comparative-impairment technique employed in
Bernhard, in that the scope of the Nevada interest was assessed by the
California court in total disregard of, and indeed in total opposition to,
how it actually had been assessed by the Nevada courts themselves.
Since the Nevada Supreme Court had held in an entirely domestic situ-
ation that Nevada's criminalization of certain types of bartender activ-
ity did not lessen Nevada's interest in preserving immunity from civil
liability for Nevada bartenders who engage in such activity, then, a
fortiori, the reach of the Nevada interest to the Bernhard-type situation
was also impliedly determined by the Nevada Court.
However, what if these suggested readings of Currie's prescription
are wrong, and he in fact intended what he seemed to state in a number
of instances: that the forum, in trying to avoid a true conflict, may re-
examine an apparent conflict by engaging in a moderate and restrained
interpretation of the policies and interests of both the forum and of the
other state, as reflected in their contending laws; and, that the forum
may do this with respect to the other state's law, as well as its own, not
with an eye toward what the other state's courts would hold, but ac-
cording to generalized, abstract principles of restraint and moderation,
to, in effect, take a position vis:a-vis the other state that asserts: "We
know, as well as you do, where your true interests lie. Though you
might decide otherwise were you seized of this question first, we decide
that you do not in fact have a real interest. Perhaps you will agree
with us when you have an occasion to deal with this question in your
own courts in the future." 70
70. As the experience during the regime of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842),
suggests, the courts of the other states are not likely to follow the forum's lead if it is based
on such an attitude. See Merrill Sinclair-Mastersom'A Study in the Role of Federal Courts
in Applying State Law, 14 OKLA. L. REv. 1 (1961).
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Identifying False Conflicts and Resolving True Conflicts
If this is in fact a correct reading of the scope of Currie's moderate
and restrained interpretation, which I strongly doubt, the question re-
mains as to whether there are any differences, philosophical or practi-
cal, between the forum engaging in this exercise at an early stage of the
analysis in order to avoid a true conflict, and engaging in it at a later
stage, via the comparative technique. In other words, are restrained
and moderate interpretation, on the one hand, and comparative im-
pairment, on the other, merely two labels for the same analytical tech-
nique, their sole difference being that they occur at different stages of
the process?
Comparative impairment advocates, would answer yes. Thus,
Professor Baxter states: "The same analysis by which Currie distin-
guishes real from false conflicts cases can resolve real conflicts cases.
' '7 1
And Professor Cavers appears to suggest the same answer when he
writes:
Currie seems to me to invite the judiciary to perform essentially the
same function he would forbid when he would allow a court in State
F to take into account the policy of State X in determining whether
the forum's policy should be considered in conflict with it, presuma-
bly in a situation where, but for the State X policy, the forum's law
would be applied.
72
Currie, however, has stated:
[Tihough the function is essentially the same, there is an important
difference between a court's construing domestic law with modera-
tion in order to avoid conflict with a foreign interest and its holding
that the foreign interest is paramount. When a court avowedly uses
the tools of construction and interpretation it invites legislative cor-
rection of error--or at least criticism from the law reviews. When it
weighs state interests and finds a foreign interest weightier it inhibits
legislative intervention and confounds criticism.
73
71. Baxter, Choice ofLaw and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 9 (1963). Pro-
fessor Baxter adds: "The question 'Will the social objective underlying the X rule be fur-
thered by the application of the rule in cases like the present one?' need not necessarily be
answered 'Yes' or 'No'; the answer will often be, 'Yes, to some extent.' The extent to which
the purpose underlying a rule will be furthered by application or impaired by nonapplica-
tion to cases of a particular category may be regarded as the measure of the rule's pertinence
and of the state's interest in the rule's application to cases within the category. Normative
resolution of real conflicts cases is possible where one of the assertedly applicable rules is
more pertinent to the case than the competing rule."
72. Cavers, The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 732, 734 n.9 (1963).
73. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 754, 759 (1963).
The discussion which follows in the text herein assumes, arguendo, that by "domestic law,"
Currie is referring to the local law of both the forum and any other concerned jurisdiction.
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Currie's proposition can be stated somewhat differently. It is one
thing for a court of State X (the forum) to say that, had the State X
legislature considered the adverse impact upon the policy of State Y
whenever a State X domestic statute is applied to a fact situation in
which State I's interests are also implicated, the State X Legislature
would not have wished the State X statute to apply; in other words that
the State X interest would not reach that kind of a situation. It is
quite another thing to say, upon the assumption that the State X inter-
est does reach that situation, implicit in finding that the interests of
State X and State Y truly conflict, that State X's interest ought to give
way to that of State Y on the ground that, though State X's interest
will be substantially, perhaps even drastically, impaired, it can be re-
garded as being somewhat less impaired than the interest of State Y.
In responding to the first determination, namely that there was no
true conflict because the State X interest did not reach the particular
fact situation in the light of the effect it would have upon State Y pol-
icy, the State X legislature can simply reply to the State X court: "You
were wrong. That was not our intention at all. To be sure, applica-
tion of our statute to this situation may create some difficulties for State
Y, but we still insist that it was and is our intent that our interest is to
be served by the application of our statute in this situation notwith-
standing this effect upon State Y." Thus, after the decision in One
1953 Ford Victoria, the California Legislature could have amended its
statute imposing a duty of investigation upon a mortgagee to establish
its innocence by specifying that this duty applies to out-of-state mortga-
gees of cars that might later be used to transport narcotics in California.
Similarly, after Bernkrant v. Fowler,74 the California Legislature could
have clarified the scope of its Statute of Frauds to specify that it ap-
plied whenever a party to a contract to make a gift of property by will
was domiciled in California at the time of the contract, regardless of
where the property was located.
By contrast, when the State X court engages in a comparative-
impairment exercise, it first concludes that the X legislature did in fact
intend to apply its rule of law to the situation before it.7 5 The court
goes on to hold that, although this was what the Xlegislature intended,
it should not have so intended, because the underlying aims of the stat-
ute can be achieved in other ways. Such reasoning becomes not a mat-
ter of construction and interpretation by the State X courts of its
74. See note 54 supra.
75. See, ag., Offshore Rental Co., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 138 Cal. Rptr. 838,
hearing granted, No. LA30820 (Aug. 4, 1977).
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legislature's intention or meaning as to the scope of enacted legislation;
rather, it is an exercise in legislative policy-making by the courts
themselves.
As Currie suggests, this cannot help but inhibit any efforts of the
State X Legislature to alter the rule that finally emerges from a deci-
sion of the State X court. While legislative overruling of judicial deci-
sions is not unknown, the hurdles that must be overcome are much
more formidable when the judicial decision purports to be based on
notions of right policy rather than upon the court's understanding of
the meaning of a legislature's previous pronouncement.
This is to be distinguished from the effect such a judicial decision
is likely to have upon the legislature of the other state, when the court
decides, as it did it Bernhard, that, under principles of comparative
impairment, the interests of that other state would be less impaired by
non-application of its law than would be the interests of the forum
court's own state if its law were not applied. In that event, the legisla-
ture of the other state, Nevada in Bernhard, would hardly feel bound
by the determination of the respective degrees of impairment of the two
states' interest found by another state's courts.
However, where the State X court, applying comparative-impair-
ment analysis, or at least purporting to do so, decides to subordinate its
own state statute to that of another state, on the ground that the inter-
ests of its own state, though palpably present, are less impaired by such
a subordination than would be the interest of the other state were its
law subordinated, the impact on its own legislature is inevitably
profound and far-reaching. The court and the legislature of State X
are, after all, two coordinate law-making bodies operating within the
same sphere. A judicial pronouncement under these circumstances
bears the stamp of special authority, deserved or not. It creates, if not
an irrebutable presumption, at least an overwhelming one, favoring the
resolution of the problem as it was achieved in its decision, since the
decision purported to be based on policy and close examination of state
interests. This is in contrast to the effect created when the state court
opinion merely purports to interpret the legislature's intention as to a
statute's scope. As suggested above, if the court errs, it is easily cor-
rected by a legislative amendment that states, in effect: "That was not
what we meant at all."'76
76. The problem has to this point been examined in the context of the forum's determi-
nation of how a state interest, derived from a state statute, is to be served when it conflicts
with the interest of another state derived from that state's statute. When the respective state
interests are rooted not in statutes, but in judicial rules promulgated in the first instance by
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Comparative Impairment and "Better Law"
The weighing of interests for the purpose of a comparative-impair-
ment analysis, that is, in order to determine which state's interests are
more intensely held77 or the relative reach of each state's policies and
interests, is thus hardly distinguishable from a weighing to determine
which is the better or worthier law. Currie viewed these techniques as
reflections of a common jurisprudential fallacy.78 Despite the elabo-
rate stages of the comparative-impairment method revealed in
Bernhard, and the protestations of its advocates to the contrary,79 it is
hard to avoid the impression that the technique is founded essentially
on an interest-counting process. This process will, in the long run,
prove no more satisfactory than the contact-counting prescribed by the
Second Restatement of the Conflict of Laws. 0
Once one accepts interest analysis as the basic approach to the
choice-of-law process, one can scarcely avoid Currie's conclusion that
the ultimate resolution of true conflicts must be made by a legislative
body that is both untainted by its own conflict of interest and is
equipped with the resources for the task, namely the United States
Congress.8' Short of that solution, which concededly is not imminent,
the courts themselves, the situation, I submit, is not qualitatively different. The court, in
deciding to limit the extra-state scope of an earlier substantive judicial rule that was origi-
nally adopted with only a domestic situation in mind is, in effect, merely ascertaining its
earlier intent. To be sure, that intent may be discerned, in part, in the light of the court's
view of the relative harm to the interests of the forum and other states whose laws are in
contention. But it is still only an intent that is being ascertained and not an unalterable rule
for choice-of-law. Since judge-made rules can be overridden by legislative enactments, for
a court to resolve a choice-of-law issue involving such rules by comparative impairment
analysis, Le., by holding that one state's interest ought to be subordinated to another's,
would inhibit legislative action just as effectively as when the court decides such issues in the
context of conflicting state statutes.
77. See Horowitz, T7he Law of Choice of Law in Calfornia-4 Restatement, 21
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 719, 753-56 (1974).
78. See, ag., Currie, "he Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests
and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 9, 81 (1959), reprinted in SELECTED EsSAYS
188, 277: "IF]or the Court to label one interest paramount and the other minimal, or one
major and the other minor, is simply to legislate. .. "
79. See, e.g., Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 13
(1963): "The suggestion is not that some rough parity in the number of instances allocated to
each state is to be achieved ......
80. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 188 (1971).
81. Their lack of resources for the task is Currie's principal reason for denying to the
federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court, the task of resolving true con-
flicts and entrusting it ultimately to the national congress. Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent
Years, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 258, 273 (1958), reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS 584, 602. Profes-
sor Baxter, on the other hand, holds that the federal courts are required to perform this
function under the full faith and credit clause and the diversity of citenzenship clause (art.
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the state courts, in resolving true conflicts ought to do only as they do
in the overwhelming majority of cases they hear, those involving no
extra-state element: apply their own law.
Post-Bernhard Case Law
Many of the deficiencies of the comparative-impairment method
discussed to this point have been underscored, and additional ones re-
vealed, by several decisions of the California Courts of Appeal purport-
ing to apply the method to cases decided after Bernhard.
Offshore Rental Co., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co.
8 2
In Offshore Rental, the plaintiff California corporation was in the
business of leasing undersea drilling equipment to oil companies. One
of its employees was injured in Louisiana on the defendant's premises
while there in connection with a contract between the plaintiff and de-
fendant for the lease of such equipment. The employee was compen-
sated for his injuries. His corporate employer then sued the defendant
company in a California court to recover for the damages it had in-
curred by losing its employee. California law permitted a corporation
to recover for such damages, but Louisiana law did not.
8 3
III, § 2) of the Constitution, using the comparative impairment analysis as their principal
tool. He recognizes no such compulsion on the state courts to adopt comparative impair-
ment analysis, though he suggests they would be acting within their authority if they volun-
tarily adopt a comparative impairment analysis. As for Baxter's claims concerning the duty
of the federal courts to apply comparative impairment analysis to resolve true conflicts,
these have been effectively put to rest by Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487
(1941), holding that the Erie doctrine requires the federal courts to apply, in cases where
they apply, the choice-of-law rules of the state courts in the states in which they sit-a prin-
ciple that has been newly confirmed by the Court in ringing terms in Day and Zimmerman,
Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975). The Klaxon principle may have been weakened some-
what by the recent decision in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), in which a
dispute over the pollution of an interstate body of water was held to be resolvable under
principles of federal common law, rather than under the law of either of the states involved.
The question that is raised by this case is whether it can be read as overriding Klaxon sub
silento and as requiring the creation of federal common law where the interests of states
collide in the suits between private litigants. The answer, however, would appear to be no
for at least two reasons. One is that even if the federal courts were to assume this role and
base it on a governmental interest analysis, there is a qualitative difference between those
cases in which a state is a party, and its governmental interests are directly implicated, and
those in which it is not, and those interests are implicated only indirectly. The other, of
course, is that Day and Zimmerman, reaffirming Klaxon, was decided three years after Illi-
nois v. City of aMilwaukee, and the Court showed not the slightest inclination of retreating
from the Klaxon rule.
82. Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 138 Cal. Rptr. 838, hearing granted,
No. LA30820 (Aug. 4, 1977).
83. 138 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
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Finding a true conflict, the California Court of Appeal relied upon
Bernhard's comparative impairment formula and held that Louisiana's
rule of nonliability would govern on this issue, since, in its view, Loui-
siana's policy would be more impaired than California's if its laws were
not applied. The court presented several reasons for its holding.
First, "as between the plaintiff visitor Offshore and stay-at-home Con-
tinental, plaintiff is in the best position to expect the risks and in the
better position to avoid the risks."84 Second, though both corporations
sought profit, the California business, Offshore Rental, entered Louisi-
ana volitionally with the hope of making profits, whereas the Louisiana
business, Continental, "was the less active in pursuit of their [sic] fman-
cial goals."85
In finding that the case presented a true conflict, the court neces-
sarily concluded that California interests were implicated. The deci-
sion was therefore not based on a One 1953 Ford Victoria-type or
Bernkrant-type of determination that the California interest did not
extend to this type of extra-state situation. This conclusion appears
sound. Unlike the situation in One 1953 Ford Victoria, no tenable ar-
gument could have been made that to impose liability under California
law upon a Louisiana tortfeasor under the circumstances of Offshore
Rental would unfairly surprise the defendant. It is a common princi-
ple of American law that tortfeasors may have to pay damages not only
to direct victims of their conduct, but also to any person or entity hav-
ing a relational interest in the continued well-being of that victim. 86
Consequently, the Louisiana tortfeasor could hardly claim unfair sur-
prise at learning that it was liable to the plaintiff corporation in Off-
shore Rental for the injuries negligently inflicted on the latter's
employee.87
84. Id. at 842.
85. Id.
86. Thus, it is not unusual for husbands or wives to be entitled to damages for loss of
consortium, parents for loss of their children's services, children for loss of their parents'
companionship, and employers for loss of their employees' services. See Green, Relational
Interests, 29 ILL. L. REv. 460 (1934).
87. By contrast, it would not have been inappropriate for the Oregon Supreme Court to
have concluded in Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1969), that the apparent
conflict in that case was not a true conflict in fact, had the court engaged in a moderate and
restrained interpretation of Oregon law to determine whether Oregon's interest in applying
the statute in issue extended to the extra-state situation before it. (Or, as Professor Sedler
might put it, whether Oregon's interest under the circumstances was a real, as opposed to a
hypothetical, interest. Sedler, in Symposium, Conflict of Laws Round Table, 49 TEx. L.
REv. 211, 225 (1971); Sedler, The Governmental Interest 4pproach to Choice of Law: An
,4nalysis and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 181, 221-27 (1977)). In Lilienthal, an
adult Oregonian had been declared a "spendthrift" by a court of that state. The effect of
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All this suggests that it would have been unreasonable for the Cal-
ifornia Court of Appeal to have held that a moderate and restrained
interpretation of California law, policy and interests resulted in a false
conflict in that case. However, the court's conclusion that, despite the
presence of a true conflict, California's policy would be less impaired
than Louisiana's by the nonapplication of its laws to the issue of the
tortfeasor's liability to the victim's employer seems wrong-headed.
This is so for a number of reasons. First, the court's observation
that the plaintiff visitor was "in the best position to expect the risks and
in the better position to avoid the risks" must be weighed against the
facts that the relationship between the parties involved a planned, con-
sensual agreement, and that the defendant knew that the plaintiff was
from California, and could have just as easily anticipated and adjusted
for the application of adverse foreign rules by obtaining insurance.
Second, it is highly probable that contact between the parties was
initiated by the defendant, since, given the nature of the business, only
the defendant would know when it needed the plaintiffs equipment.
Third, while an inquiry into the relative hardship upon the parties
of anticipating and providing for the application of the other state's law
might be appropriate to determine whether unfair surprise was present
in the situation, and therefore whether the scope of the California rule
of liability should be limited in order to avoid a true conflict, 88 this is
such a judicial declaration was to incapacitate that adult from entering into binding con-
tracts without court approval. But the "spendthrift" "contracted" in California with an-
other person who knew nothing about the Oregon judicial declaration. When that person
sued in Oregon on the "contract," the court held that a true conflict was presented and
applied forum, ie., Oregon's, law. But the Oregon court, unlike the California Court of
Appeal in Offshore Rental, could have reasonably concluded that it was faced with merely a
false, rather than a true, conflict. Its reasoning could have proceeded along these lines: 1)
Spendthrift statutes are relatively rare these days; 2) When an Oregonian, who has been
adjudged a "spendthrift," as here, contracts with an innocent party in another state, the
latter having absolutely no notice of the judicially-imposed contractual disability of this
apparently able-bodied compos mentis adult, that other party will be unfairly surprised by
an ultimate determination that the Oregonian can in fact disaffirm the contract; 3) There-
fore, the Oregon legislature did not intend to have it apply under these circumstances. The
phrase "did not intend" is emphasized to distinguish such a conclusion by the Oregon court
from one that states, in effect, that the Oregon legislature shouldnot have intended the statute
to reach such situation in light of the comparative impairment principle. See text following
note 73 supra. Nor does the above imply that Lilienthal's finding of a true conflict was
improper, since, so long as the Court was limiting itself, expressly or implicitly, to determin-
ing the intent of the Oregon legislature regarding the scope, reach, or extent, of the statute's
operation, any difference of opinion between it and the legislature could be easily corrected
by the latter.
88. As was done in One 1953 Ford Victoria and, as suggested in the text at note 37
supra, in Bernhard itself, despite the courts' subsuming this aspect of its discussion in
[Vol. 30
quite different from a determination of the respective interests of both
states. Thus, had the relative hardship factor been cited as a justifica-
tion for not extending the scope of the California doctrine to this situa-
tion, there simply would have been no need to consider the resolution
of a true conflict, since, under the court's reasoning, no true conflict
would have been found. The above factors point to the presence of a
strong California interest in having its law applied to the situation
before the court in Offshore Rental.
In sum, the effect of the California Court of Appeal's decision in
Offshore Rental is to deny to a California plaintiff recovery for an in-
jury which the court, by finding the presence of a true conflict, neces-
sarily determined California had an interest in allowing despite any
contrary interest of Louisiana.
As of the date of writing of this Article, the California Supreme
Court had granted a hearing in Offshore Rental, and the decision is
pending.
8 9
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles"
Beech, an aircraft manufacturer, was sued in California for wrong-
ful death resulting from an accident in New Mexico arising out of the
allegedly defective manufacture of a plane. Beech sought a writ of
mandate to compel the trial court'to grant its motion for summary
judgment declaring New Mexico law to be applicable in determining
the rights and liabilities of the parties. New Mexico law required that,
in a strict liability case, the defect leading to the injury be "unreasona-
bly dangerous," a requirement that had been rejected by the California
Supreme Court in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corporation91 as burdening
"the injured [party] with proof of an element that rings of negli-
gence."' 92 Cronin had further stated that "public policy demands that
responsibility be fixed whenever it will most effectively reduce the
hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the
Bernhard under the heading of comparative impairment analysis designed to resolve a true
conflict.
89. Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 138 Cal. Rptr. 838, hearing granted,
No. LA30820 (Aug. 4, 1977). While this Article was at press, the California Supreme Court
rendered its decision in Offshore Rental. A discussion and analysis of that decision appears
in the postscript at the end of this Article.
90. 61 Cal. App. 3d 501, 132 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1976).
91. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
92. Id. at 132, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
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market." 93
Commenting on this choice-of-law issue, the California Court of
Appeal stated: "Given this strong expression of forum interest and the
presence of the California defendant [the manufacturer of a defective
latch], we feel that, absent a strong showing that application of New
Mexico law would 'further the interest' of that state forum law should
apply to the instant case."
'94
This comment was purportedly addressed to the trial court to
guide it in applying Bernhard's comparative-impairment approach to
this issue of substantive product-liability law. Significantly, the court
does not speak here of which interest would be least or most impaired
by the nonapplication of that state's law. Rather, it speaks of the
strength of the New Mexico interest. Notwithstanding its earlier deter-
mination that California's interest in the application of its own law was
strong indeed, it suggests by negative implication that if the New Mex-
ico interest were strong too, not necessarily stronger, then California
law would not be applied to this issue of product liability.
This analysis only compounds the confusion. Even the most ar-
dent supporters of comparative impairment have not suggested that if
both interests are equally "strong" there is any reason to prefer the
foreign interest to that of the forum. Equally troublesome is the ambi-
guity in the court's use of the word "strong." Does the court mean
important, worthwhile, or just, or does "strong interest" imply, as Pro-
fessor Horowitz advocates as justification for applying the compara-
tive-impairment technique, that the interest is intensely held?95 How
does one measure these factors in a case such as this?
That this discussion by the court appeared under a subheading in
the opinion entitled, "The Lower Court Should Weigh the Following
Facts and Policies in Determining Choice of Law' 96 also illustrates the
93. Id. at 129, 501 P.2d at 1159, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 439 (quoting Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)).
94. 61 Cal. App. 3d at 523, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 553. In addition to deciding this issue, the
court also held: I) summary judgment may be employed to determine the applicable law, if
all other conditions for granting summary judgment are present; and 2) the New Mexico
Supreme Court determination, upon certification from the United States Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in a related case, that New Mexico law permits a manufacturer to be sued
for a passenger's death as a result of defects in the manufacture of a "public conveyance,"
and that the remedy against the owners of the defective public conveyance was not exclu-
sive, renders New Mexico and California law on this issue identical and therefore moots this
choice-of-law issue.
95. Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California-4 Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 719, 753-56 (1974).
96. 61 Cal. App. 3d at 521, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 552 (emphasis supplied).
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correctness of Currie's suggestion that there is no qualitative difference
between comparative impairment and value-weighing; or, at the very
least, that these two functions are readily confused by the courts.
Hall v. University of Nevada97
Plaintiffs were injured in an automobile accident by a car driven
in California by an employee of the University of Nevada, a state uni-
versity. The combined effect of two Nevada statutes98 was to waive
Nevada's sovereign immunity, but to limit its liability to $25,000 per
claimant. In an earlier case between these parties,99 the California
Supreme Court had held that the University defendant was not im-
mune from suit in California. In the subsequent trial, the plaintiff was
awarded a judgment of $1,150,000, and the defendant appealed the
trial court's denial of its motion to limit damages.
The Court of Appeal held that the limitation imposed by the Ne-
vada statute was inapplicable, since the defendant's amenability to suit
in California was not based upon its limited waiver of sovereign immu-
nity, but on the limitation of its sovereign protection to the area within
its own borders; that the full faith and credit clause did not require
California to apply a Nevada statute that offended California public
policy; and, most important for present purposes, that California's own
choice-of-law rules did not require the application of the Nevada limi-
tation on liability in this case.
For this last conclusion, the Court once more applied compara-
tive-impairment analysis, finding "the policy reasons for applying Cali-
fornia law herein to be even stronger than those found in Bernhard."100
In Bernhard, the
defendant's culpable conduct occurred entirely within Nevada's own
borders, yet the Supreme Court found that merely by soliciting cus-
tomers from California, knowing and expecting such customers to
use California's highways, defendant had 'put itself at the heart of
California's regulatory interest ... .' [citation omitted]. Here, the
State of Nevada's activities and respondents' resulting injuries took
place within California. By thus utilizing the public highways
within our state to conduct its business, Nevada should fully expect
to be held accountable under California's laws. 101
The court concluded:
97. 74 Cal. App. 3d 280, 141 Cal. Rptr. 439 (1977).
98. NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 41.031, 41.035 (1977).
99. Hall v. University of Nev., 8 Cal. 3d 522, 503 P.2d 1363, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1972).
100. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 286, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
101. Id. (citation omitted).
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The imposition of unlimited liability upon Nevada involves at most
an increased economic exposure which, at least for businesses which
actively solicit extensive California patronage, is a foreseeable and
coverable business expense. (See Bernhard, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p.
323, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, 546 P.2d 719.) Given the fact that Nevada
has chosen to engage in governmental and business activity in this
state, the necessary acquisition of additional insurance coverage to
protect itself during such activity is an entirely foreseeable and rea-
sonable expense.' 0 2
This reasoning by the court creates a number of problems. First,
the fact that additional insurance coverage is an entirely "foreseeable
and reasonable expense" would seem to apply equally to the defendant,
Continental Oil Company, in Offshore Rental. However, the Court of
Appeal in that case entirely ignored that factor and determined that
Louisiana, rather than California, law was to be applied under the
comparative-impairment principle. This illustrates the unpredictable
and manipulable character of the technique in the first place.
Second, to the extent that the "intensity" of a state's interest is a
relevant factor in determining which state's interest would be most im-
paired by the nonapplication of its own laws, 10 3 a strong case can be
made for the proposition that, though Nevada's interest in Bernhard
was strong, °4 it is even stronger in Hall. In Hall the state was, after
all, a party in the suit. The judgment in excess of one million dollars,
were it to stand, would come directly out of its own coffers. The ge-
nius of Currie's governmental interests analysis resides in his recogni-
tion of the presence of such interests in suits between private
litigants. 05 Still, a tenable argument can be made for the proposition
that, other things being equal, governmental interests will usually be
stronger in those cases in which the government is itself a party than in
those in which it is not. Yet, in gauging the strength of Nevada's inter-
est in Hall, the court does not even mention, much less "weigh," this
fact.
Third, insofar as the court suggests that the defendant state of Ne-
vada could have insured against such potential liability for its activities
within California (having one of its agents driving a Nevada govern-
ment automobile), there is a strong probability that Nevada, like many
102. Id. (citation omitted).
103. Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California-A Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 719, 753-56 (1974).
104. See text following note 42 supra.
105. That recognition has been criticized. See, e.g., Kegel, The Crisis of Conflict of
Laws, 112 RECUEIL DES COURS 91, 180-82 (1964); Rheinstein, How to Review a Festschrft,
11 Am. J. COMP. L. 632, 664 (1962).
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other states, is a self-insurer with respect to its tort liability. Yet, in
purporting to apply the comparative-impairment method, the Court of
Appeal simply overlooks this factor. Had it not done so, one may le-
gitimately ask how the court would have measured the "intensity" of
Nevada's interest in limiting its own monetary liability for tort as
against the "intensity" of California's interest in "providing full protec-
tion to those who are injured on its highways through the negligence of
both residents and nonresidents."' 10 6
This is not to say that Hall's result is wrong under a governmental
interest analysis. Clearly this is a case in which both California and
Nevada have substantial interests in the application of their respective
rules of decision to the issue of limiting the award of damages. It is not
a case which, by a moderate and restrained interpretation of Califor-
nia's interest, 0 7 can reasonably be held to present a false conflict. The
accident occurred in California, and the plaintiffs were Californians.
Under such circumstances, it is a virtual certainty that neither the Cali-
fornia Legislature, were this a statutory question, nor the California
courts would limit the scope of the California protective policy in order
to accommodate the interests of Nevada. In short, the conclusion that
the situation in Hall presents a true conflict can hardly be avoided.
That being the case, had Currie's proposed resolution of the true con-
flict been followed, the result would have been the same as the one
actually reached, since California law, as the law of the forum, would
have been applied.
In other situations, however, the Currie prescription for resolving
true conflicts would yield a different result than a comparative-
impairment analysis. A result like the one in Offshore Rental would
not be possible, should the Currie method be employed, nor would the
California courts be cast into the unbecoming role of super-legislative
bodies, passing judgment on which states' interests, strongly implicated
in the laws of two or more states, are more strongly or intensely re-
garded by those states. Most important, were the same case to arise in
a Nevada court, and that court to apply Currie's method, it would first
determine that there was, in fact, a true conflict. Then, cleaving to
Currie's methods, it would resolve that true conflict by applying its own
law. The Nevada Court would thus have limited each claimant to an
award of $25,000 instead of the judgment of over a million dollars re-
covered in California.
106. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 285-86, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
107. Or even of Nevada's. For a discussion of which states' interests are to be subjected
to such an interpretation, see text following note 59 supra.
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The underlying premise of the comparative-impairment method,
by contrast, is that the same result will be reached whichever state ap-
plies the technique to the same set of facts. Each state is presumed to
be able to discern the relative intensity of the interest of the respective
states whose laws are in contention and decide in favor of the one
whose interest will be more (or most, in the case of more than two
concerned states) impaired by the nonapplication of its laws.
Even if Nevada were persuaded to adopt the comparative-impair-
ment methodology, is it conceivable that the damage issue in a Hall-
type case would be resolved by the Nevada courts on the basis of a
finding that California's interest would be more impaired by the non-
application of its law to that issue? Realism, rather than cynicism, sug-
gests that is hardly likely to occur.
The comparative-impairment method is not likely to engender the
desired uniformity of results on the same issue in the courts of different
states. The more probable result is an occasional decision, such as Off-
shore Rental, in which a court, in a confused eruption of charity toward
the interest of an out-of-state party, disserves a real, substantial, and
worthy interest of one of its own citizens and its own state.
"Better Law"
Professor Robert Leflar has proposed five basic considerations in
making the choice-of-law decision. 08 They are: 1) predictability of
results; 2) maintenance of interstate and international order; 3) simpli-
fication of the judicial task; 4) advancement of the forum's governmen-
tal interests; and 5) application of the better rule of law.
For present purposes, it is the last consideration, application of the
"better rule of law," with special emphasis on its use in resolving a true
conflict, that will be examined. In many cases, especially those involv-
ing unplanned torts, the first three considerations present few
problems, 0 9 and the fourth, advancement of the forum's governmental
interests, merely represents one aspect of the Currie approach.
Though Professor Leflar has in recent years intimated that he now
regards the better law approach as a description of how judges do be-
have rather than a recipe for how they should behave," 0 a number of
courts have adopted "better law" as an outright device for resolving
108. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L.
REv. 1584, 1585-88 (1966).
109. See, eg., Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
110. Leflar, The "New" Choice ofLaw, 21 AM. U. L. Rv. 457, 474 (1972).
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what can properly be characterized as true conflicts. One of the more
noteworthy cases doing this is Milkovich v. Saari,"' decided by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in 1973.
In Milkovich, a group of Ontario residents drove to Duluth, Min-
nesota, to attend a play. One of them, a guest-passenger, was injured
when the car left the road in Minnesota. Minnesota does not have a
guest statute, Ontario does.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that, under the circumstances
of this case, Minnesota rather than Ontario law would be applied on
the issue of the degree of care owed to a guest-passenger. The court
relied on Leflar's five "choice-influencing" considerations. The first
three, for the reasons suggested above, were disposed of summarily.
The existence of a governmental interest on the part of the forum was
discerned in its role as a "justice-administering state,"" 2 that is, that
"persons who come into [Minnesota] to litigate controversies with sub-
stantial [Minnesota] connections have these cases determined according
to rules consistent with [Minnesota] concepts of justice, or at least not
inconsistent with them."'"1 3 A more satisfactory analysis of the nature
of the forum's interest in Milkovich appears in the court's later obser-
vation that "persons injured in automobile accidents occurring within
our borders can reasonably be expected to require treatment in our
medical facilities, both public and private. . . with a consequent gov-
ernmental interest that injured persons not be denied recovery on the
basis of doctrines foreign to Minnesota.""1
4
Although the court did not discuss the issue in these terms, the
presence of the forum's interest in Milkovich on either of these grounds
created a true conflict. The interest of the other concerned "state,"
Ontario, in the application of its guest statute to the situation in that
case was clear. The driver, guest-passenger, and host were all Ontari-
ans, and the host had garaged, registered, and insured her automobile
in Ontario. Regardless of whether the purpose of the guest statute was
to deter suits by ungrateful guests or to discourage collusion to defraud
111. 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
112. 295 Minn. at 165, 203 N.W.2d at 414.
113. Id.
114. 295 Minn. at 170-71, 203 N.W.2d at 417. This proposition has been stated some-
what more pointedly as follows: "[Tlhe state of injury, which has to clean up the mess left by
injuries, often including substantial medical and hospital expenses, normally has an interest
in the application of its liability-imposing rule, since a liability recovery may provide the
only means by which the injured person may meet these obligations." R. CRAMToN, D.
CURRIE & H. KAY, CoNFLIcr OF LAWS 323 (2d ed. 1975) (citing CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS
at 144-45).
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local insurance companies," 5 Ontario had a definite, real, and impor-
tant interest in the application of its law to this issue. It is against this
background that the court's discussion of the "better law" considera-
tion takes on special significance. Whether it described its own action
this way or not, it was in fact using the "better law" factor to resolve a
true conflict.
On this point, the Milkovich court decided that the law of Minne-
sota, which contained no guest statute and therefore allowed a guest to
recover from a host for injuries caused by the latter's ordinary negli-
gence, was "better" than the law of Ontario which required proof of
gross negligence for such a recovery.
What made the Minnesota law on this issue better? In the court's
words: "No American state has newly adopted a guest statute for many
years. Courts of states which did adopt them are today construing
them much more narrowly, evidencing their dissatisfaction with
them. . . . Though still on the books, they contradict the spirit of the
times." 116 In an earlier decision the same court had stated: "[Tihe ap-
plication of a guest statute such as this produces a result inconsistent
with current conceptions." ' 17 The more recent adoption of one state's
law may, therefore, make it "better" than another state's law.
However, a new law is not necessarily better than an older doc-
trine. It is by no means unusual, for example, for courts and legisla-
tures to return to discarded doctrines when new ones prove
unworkable; indeed, a statute is often repealed for precisely this reason.
Moreover, not all courts will agree that newer legal doctrines are
necessarily the better law. In Alabama Great Southern AA Co. v.
Carroll, 8 for example, the Alabama Supreme Court refused to apply
the newly-enacted Alabama statute abrogating the fellow-servant de-
fense in a case involving an Alabama railroad employee injured in
Mississippi as a result of defendant's negligent conduct in Alabama.
Although the court, in applying Mississippi law that retained the fel-
low-servant defense, was merely following a traditional jurisdiction-se-
lecting rule which looked to the law of the place of injury, it resisted the
escape device of characterizing the action as one in contract, which
would have permitted it to select Alabama law as the governing law.
115. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
116. 295 Minn. at 163, 203 N.W.2d at 413 (quoting Chief Justice Kenison in Clark v.
Clark, 107 N.H. at 357, 22 A.2d at 210).
117. Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 146, 158 N.W.2d 254, 259 (1968).
118. 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
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The refusal to apply the highly manipulative device 19 of characteriza-
tion may well have reflected the court's view that the fellow-servant
defense of Mississippi law, although older than the law of the forum,
which abrogated that defense, was in fact the "better" law. In other
words, though the court was clearly bound to follow its own legisla-
ture's directive in an entirely internal or domestic case, it felt free to
apply earlier, prestatutory notions of the fellow-servant defense in the
case of an Alabama worker, hired in Alabama, who, as a result of a
negligent act occurring in Alabama, was injured in Mississippi-absent
a clear legislative directive that the fellow-servant doctrine was to be
deemed abrogated even in this situation.
The history of the guest statutes is itself an effective refutation of
the better law approach which intimates that newer is better. When
enacted the guest statutes themselves represented the newer law modi-
fying the preexisting common law which had allowed guests to recover
from their hosts for the latter's ordinary negligence.
120
Nevertheless, the notion that "newer is better" has been explicitly
advanced by three distinguished commentators: Professors Arthur von
Mehren and Donald Trautman of the Harvard Law School in their
1965 book, The Law of Mfultistate Problems, and Professor Russell
Weintraub of the University of Texas Law School in his 1971 treatise,
Commentary on the Conflict of Laws. In each instance, the notion has
been advanced in connection with the search for methods to resolve the
true conflict, because, up to the point where the true conflict is identi-
fied, all three generally agree with Currie's approach and methodology.
In the view of von Mehren and Trautman, a basic principle to be
kept in mind when dealing with a true conflict is that "a court should
apply a law reflecting an 'emerging' rather than a 'regressing' pol-
icy."' 2 ' Similarly, Professor Weintraub has urged that the "objective
anachronism" of a rule of law "is a satisfactory basis for resolving true
conflicts."' 22 In his view, a "rule is objectively anachronistic when
119. See, eg., Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163
(1928).
120. Cf. Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 574, 267 A.2d 854, 860 (1970) (Roberts, J.
dissenting): "From this examination it will be seen that guest statutes such as Delaware's
clearly represent 'regressing' policies and that the common law rule represents the better rule
of law." See also Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 754,
780 (1963): "It may be well to remember that not all minority rules are archaisms. Almost
all progressive innovations in the law are in the minority for a while."
121. R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 360 (2d ed. 1975) (citing
A. VON MEMrEN & D. TRAuTmAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 376-92 (1965)).
122. Weintraub, The Future of Choice of Law for Torts: "hat Principles Should be
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over recent times many states with the rule have abandoned it and
none or very few have adopted it.' 23 In a qualified endorsement of
the comparative-impairment technique, Professor Weintraub has re-
cently suggested that a "cogent basis" for applying that technique "is
present if the state with the opposing rule has, since the occurrence in
issue, changed its rule for future cases to accord with the rule of the
other state. This is most likely to occur if the changed rule was objec-
tively anachronistic."'' 24
The undesirable ends to which the better law approach, along with
its corollary that newer is better, can lead us are perhaps best illustrated
by Professor Weintraub's latest prescription for resolving true conflicts
in torts: the application of the law that will lead to a recovery by the
plaintiff. To be sure, this result-oriented rule is described by its author
as being only a "presumption," rebuttable by a showing that the plain-
tiff-favoring rule is itself "objectively anachronistic" (as might be said
today of actions for alienation of affections, suggests Professor Wein-
traub) or that the defendant's activities might make it unfair to burden
him with liability. But in view of what is suggested as necessary to
rebut this presumption, it is clear that it would nevertheless be an ex-
tremely heavy one that would rarely be overcome should the courts be
persuaded to adopt it in future cases.
The plaintiff-favoring presumption for torts conflicts suggests that
we have come full circle from Currie's proposed resolution of a true
conflict. A major criticism of Currie was that to permit the forum al-
ways to apply its own law to resolve a true conflict was unprincipled,
selfish, and insensitive to the needs of a multi-state system. But at least
the forum, in applying its own law in such a situation, produced results
that sometimes favored defendants and sometimes plaintiffs. The pro-
posed plaintiff-recovery rule125 gives the unavoidable impression of be-
Preferred?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Spring 1977, at 159 (citing R. WEINTRAUB, COMMEN-
TARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 206-07 (1971)).
123. Id.
124. Id. (citations omitted).
125. In relevant part, the rule reads: "TRUE CONFLICT"' CASES: IF TWO OR
MORE STATES HAVING CONTACTS WITH THE PARTIES OR THE TRANSAC-
TION WILL HAVE THE POLICIES UNDERLYING THEIR DIFFERENT TORT
RULES ADVANCED, APPLY THE LAW THAT WILL FAVOR THE PLAINTIFF UN-
LESS ONE OR BOTH OF THE FOLLOWING FACTORS IS PRESENT:
a. THAT LAW IS ANACHRONISTIC.
b. THE STATE WITH THAT LAW DOES NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT CONTACT
WITH THE DEFENDANT OR THE DEFENDANTS ACTUAL OR IN-
TENDED COURSE OF CONDUCT TO MAKE APPLICATION OF ITS LAW
REASONABLE." Id. at 163.
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ing much more unprincipled than anything ever suggested by Currie.
Indeed, it may raise serious constitutional questions under the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. It
also appears to violate the fundamental tenets of governmental interest
analysis despite its author's professed adherence to that approach to
general choice-of-law problems.
The plaintiff-recovery formula makes explicit what is only implicit
in the better law approach previously advocated by Leflar and adopted
by some courts, namely, that it is appropriate for a state court to apply
the law of another state as the "better law," while in an entirely internal
or domestic case it would perforce apply its own law to a similar factual
situation. Moreover, it would be required to do this even in cases in
which the forum had an interest in protecting a defendant from liability
because, for example, the defendant was a domiciliary of that state.
Thus, it seems that under the plaintiff-recovery rule, if the forum
disallowed suits between spouses, to preserve domestic harmony
among families within the state, among other reasons, it could adhere
to that rule if the suit were entirely domestic in character. If, however,
the suit took on extra-state elements, for example, if the wife estab-
lished a separate domicile in another state 126 that permitted suits be-
tween spouses for negligence, the forum would then be bound to apply
the law of that other state because that law created the conditions for a
plaintiff-recovery.
Similarly, if the forum had a guest statute and the other state did
not, the defendant was a forum domiciliary insured by a forum insur-
ance company, and the plaintiff was domiciled in another state, the
proposed rule would require the forum to apply the law of the other
state.
Perhaps most troublesome, from a long-range perspective, is the
result that would be reached if at some future date there were a reversal
of doctrine by a majority of states that had previously imposed civil
liability upon tavern owners for damages caused to third parties by
drunken patrons of the tavern. If California were to adhere to this
concept of liability in an entirely domestic situation for the next 50
years,127 but by then most of the states that had previously created such
126. This is permissible in a number of states. See L. KANowrrz, WOMEN AND THE
LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 48 (1969).
127. On September 19, 1978, the governor of California signed into law S.B. 1645, which
insulates persons who sell alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated person from civil
liability to third persons suffering injury as a result of intoxication by the consumer of such
alcoholic beverages. The specific concern expressed in the text is therefore mooted insofar
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liability had abrogated it, so that no-liability could be said to be
"emerging" law while liability would be characterized as "objectively
anachronistic," would the proposed presumption favoring plaintiff re-
covery apply, or would it be rebutted by the "regressive" or "anachro-
nistic" character of the California doctrine? If the latter were the
answer, would that not mean once more that the forum, in this case
California, which had a strong policy designed to protect its residents
from being injured on its highways by the conduct of persons, wherever
it might occur, that is reasonably certain to produce the danger of such
injuries, would have to subordinate that interest to the law of another
state because, not then being "objectively anachronistic," the law of
that state is deemed "better?"
When the question is posed this way, it becomes clear that the
heart of the debate over resolving true conflicts implicates fundamental
jurisprudential questions. The essence of the plaintiff-recovery pre-
sumption is based on a "better law" foundation, its novelty residing
only in an aprioi determination that, in the overwhelming majority of
tort cases, laws allowing plaintiffs to recover for their losses are "bet-
ter" than those that do not. This, in turn, necessarily rests on what can
only be described as a "natural-law" approach to the nature and func-
tion of law, a presumption that a super-law-giver, whether denomi-
nated a deity, or Reason, or Progress, prescribes the right rules of
human behavior; and that the adoption of the plaintiff-recovery pre-
sumption simply represents a successful effort at ascertaining the inten-
tion of that "brooding omnipresence in the sky."
Such an approach ignores the tenets of legal positivism that
teaches that law is what earthly law-makers, courts and legislatures, say
it is; that evaluations of law as "better" or "worse" as abstract proposi-
tions, that is, without regard to the intentions of those who make the
law, are meaningless.'
28
An equally serious failing in such an approach is the abandonment
of neutral principles of adjudication, at least with regard to the interests
of the parties before the court. To be sure, adoption of the plaintiff-
recovery presumption might prove to be a much more effective catalyst
to congressional action in coping with the true conflict problem than
Currie's prescribed application of forum law. Because few courts have
adopted Currie's prescription for resolving a true conflict, it is prema-
ture to predict what effect its widespread adoption would have on con-
as California is concerned. The concern expressed in the text remains, however, an impor-
tant analytical problem.
128. See H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1949).
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gressional inertia in this field. It is virtually certain, however, that
congressional adoption of any type of plaintiff-recovery presumption
would be extremely vulnerable under the federal constitution.
Conclusion
To return to the comparative-impairment issue, it is clear that,
when compared with Currie's method for resolving true conflicts, it too
raises fundamental jurisprudential questions. Despite its proponents'
claims that the method is distinguishable from a weighing of govern-
mental interests to find the better or worthier law, the method's impre-
cision, its manipulability in according greater or lesser weight or
significance to the respective interests, and its propensity to engage in
interest-counting, all suggest that the claimed distinction is one without
a difference. In short, the comparative-impairment method also ap-
pears to reflect natural-law premises, despite the professed adherence
of its proponents to positivist assumptions.
Viewed in this light, the issue appears to reduce itself to a simple
question of where one stands in the centuries-old debate between legal
positivism and natural-law. This Article is obviously not the place to
explore the dimensions of that debate. Suffice it to say, for the mo-
ment, that I am persuaded that the correctness of neither position is
susceptible of objective proof. It is, in the final analysis, a question of a
clash of faiths, a matter of "which church on attends," and I have al-
ways found the environment of legal positivism to be more congenial
than that of natural law.129
Currie's teachings are rooted, consciously and deliberately, in the
soil of legal positivism. His emphasis on governmental-interest analy-
sis as a substitute for the earlier vested-rights approach to the choice-of-
law process was a triumph of legal positivism over natural law. His
prescription to apply forum law in the case of the true conflict reflects
the same jurisprudential premises. The comparative-impairment
method and the better law approach, by contrast, are, fundamentally,
products of natural-law thinking.
The question to be pondered by the courts is a simple one: "Which
side are you on?"
129. See Kanowitz, The Place of Sanctions in Professor H.LA. Hart's Concept of Law, 5
DuQ. L. Rrv. 1 (1966).
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Postscript
While this Article was being printed, the California Supreme
Court rendered its decision in Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil
Co. 130 Those who hoped that the court's first post-Bernhard choice-
of-law decision would elucidate the comparative-impairment technique
will be disappointed. Indeed, the court's surprisingly unanimous deci-
sion in Offshore Rental is subject to criticism for a number of reasons.
First, it appears to have misapplied the very comparative-impairment
technique it espouses by failing adequately to evaluate the purpose of
the Louisiana rule in question, and consequently the nature of Louisi-
ana's interest in having its law applied in the instant case. Second,
despite its insistence that it is adhering to a comparative-impairment
analysis, it seems to have in fact relied heavily upon a "better law"
analysis, thereby confirming the suggestion made in the text of this Ar-
ticle of a close affinity between the two methods. Finally, although the
court purports to be resolving a true conflict, its analysis of the respec-
tive interests of California and Louisiana in having their laws applied
to the situation before the court suggests very strongly that the court
has transformed the situation into one involving a false conflict, with
Louisiana being the only state with a real interest in having its law
applied.
The facts in Offshore Rental, it will be recalled, were relatively
simple. Plaintiff, Offshore Rental Company, a California corporation,
leased oil drilling equipment to the defendant Continental Oil Co. in
Louisiana. Continental is a Delaware corporation, headquartered in
New York, and doing business in many states, including Louisiana. In
connection with the lease of equipment, plaintiffs vice-president, re-
ferred to by the supreme court as a "key employee," visited defendant's
premises in Louisiana where defendant negligently caused him injury.
Although defendant compensated the vice-president for his injuries,
plaintiff corporation sued in a California court for the loss of its key
employee's services. California law apparently permits a recovery
under such circumstances, while Louisiana law apparently does not.
In discussing the respective laws and interests of California and
Louisiana that are apparently in contention here, the supreme court
provides us with many more details than did the vacated opinion of the
district court of appeal. We learn, for example, that the right in Cali-
130. 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
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fornia of an employer to sue for his employee's injuries caused by a
third party is based partly on California Civil Code section 49 which
states in pertinent part that "[tihe rights of personal relations forbid
. . . [amny injury to a servant which affects his ability to serve his
master, other than seduction, abduction or criminal conversation,' u31
and partly on dicta in various California cases.
132
The Louisiana law of nonliability, on the other hand, is based pri-
marily on a decision of that state's court of appeal in Bonfanti Indus-
tries, Inc. v. ['eke, Inc. ,133 which was affirmed without opinion by its
supreme court. In Bonfanti, the Louisiana court held that, notwith-
standing a Louisiana statute that states "[t]he master may bring an ac-
tion against any man for beating or maiming his servant,"' 134 a
corporate plaintiff could state no cause of action in modem law for the
loss of services of its officer. This result was reached by the Louisiana
court by reading the statute in question as applying only to "indentured
servants, apprentices and others who are bound in the service of an
individual for a specific time."'135 In that court's view, allowing recov-
ery beyond such situations would lead to "undesirable social and legal
consequences."1 36
From this language, the California Supreme Court discerns a
strong Louisiana policy "to protect negligent resident tort-feasors act-
ing within Louisiana's borders from the financial hardships caused by
the assessment of excessive legal liability or exaggerated claims result-
ing from the loss of services of a key employee."' 137
Initially, it should be observed that this conclusion about the na-
ture of Louisiana's policy and interest is not the only one that can be
drawn from Bonfant. An equally plausible characterization of the
Louisiana policy under the circumstances is that Louisiana simply
denies corporate employers the right to recover for their loss of key
employees from third-party tortfeasors; and that this policy is designed
not to provide added protection to those tortfeasors, but rather is based
on an assumption that certain types of employers are better able to as-
sume the financial risks, through insurance or otherwise, for the loss of
key employees, than other employers. If that were the case, it would
131. CAL. CIV. CODE § 49 (West 1954).
132. See, &g., Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377, 354 P.2d 1073
(1960); Darmour Prod. Corp. v. H.M. Baruch Corp., 135 Cal. App. 351, 27 P.2d 664 (1933).
133. 224 So. 2d 15 (La. App.), af'd, 254 La. 779, 226 So. 2d 770 (1969).
134. LA. CIV. CODE ANN., art. 174 (West 1952).
135. 224 So. 2d at 17.
136. Id
137. 22 Cal. 3d at 163-64, 583 P.2d at 725, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
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represent a policy about Louisiana corporations and perhaps some
other types of employers; it would not indicate a Louisiana policy with
respect to non-resident corporations which are regulated by the states
that created them.
A second plausible reading of the purposes behind the Louisiana
rule denving certain employers the right to sue for their damages flow-
ing from the injury inflicted upon their employees by third-party
tortfeasors may be found in Baughman Surgical Associates, Ltd v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,138 a case cited but not discussed by the
California Supreme Court in Offshore Rental. In Baughman, a Louisi-
ana Court of Appeals denied the right to sue for such damages because
they are "too remote, too speculative and evasive to prove and are
merely consequential of the accident."1 39 To permit such suits, stated
the Louisiana court, "would open the door to the prosecution of claims
for damages indirectly and remotely connected with the tortious act and
encourage a multolicity of suitsfrom which numerous conflicts of interest
might ensue."140 The "undesirable social and legal consequences" re-
ferred to in Bonfanti might, therefore, not have had anything to do with
protecting third party tortfeasors from extended liability. Rather, its
principal concern might have been the problem of multiplicity of suits
and conflicts of interests-matters not necessarily impinging upon the
interests of a tortfeasor but rather upon the Louisiana courts and the
relations between the tortfeasor's victim and the latter's employer.
Were such the case, Louisiana would have no interest in preventing the
instant suit from being brought in a California court.
Nevertheless, the court concludes that "this case involves a true
conflict between the law of Louisiana and the law of California."' 4 1
The court reached this conclusion by reading the Louisiana policy and
interest as being aimed at protecting Louisiana tortfeasors from ex-
tended liability to the employers of most persons they injure, finding a
California policy that the court assumes "for purposes of analysis...
does provide an employer with a cause of action for negligent injury to
a key employee,"' 42 and observing that this latter policy "extends be-
yond such an injury inflicted within California, since California's econ-
omy and tax revenues are affected regardless of the situs of physical
138. 302 So. 2d 316 (La. App. 1974).
139. Id at 319.
140. Id (quoting Forcum-James Co. v. Duke Trans. Co., 231 La. 953, 93 So. 2d 228
(1957)) (emphasis added).
141. 22 Cal. 3d at 164, 583 P.2d at 725, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
142. Id at 163, 583 P.2d at 724, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
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injury."
14 3
To resolve this true conflict, the court purports to apply a compar-
ative-impairment analysis, specifically examining three criteria: 1) the
current status of the laws in contention;144 2) the comparative perti-
nence of the concern of the contending jurisdictions in having their
laws applied to this situation1 45 (or, what might better be described as
the intensity of their interest in having their laws applied); and 3) as
part of the last criterion, whether a state's policy "may easily be satis-
fied by some means other than enforcement of the statute itself," as, for
example, by insurance. 46
In examining the current status of the laws in contention, the court
determines that the Louisiana policy, which it characterizes as not
sanctioning "actions for harm to business employees,"' 47 is in line with
the view of the majority of common law states that have considered the
matter. 48 As a result, Louisiana's rule of nonliability is characterized
by the court as reflecting "relevant and progressive" law.149 Although
the court does not use the expression, it is clear that it regards the rule
of nonliability under such circumstances to be "emerging" and, for that
reason, "better."
As for California's liability rule, although the court does not use
Professor Weintraub's "objectively anachronistic" formula, 50 that the
court regards the California rule as anachronistic is clear both inferen-
tially from its approving reference to Louisiana's "progressive" rule
and expressly from what it says about the California rule itself.
The California rule is not strongly held, concludes the court, for
two reasons: its desuetude and its archaic character. As for the first
reason, the court observes that "California has itself exhibited little
concern in applying section 49 to the employer-employee relationship:
despite the provisions of the antique statute, no California court has
heretofore squarely held that California law provides an action for
harm to business employees, and no California court has recently con-
sidered the issue at all."' 51 Aside from the fact that this suggests that
the court may not have been faced with a true conflict after all, which is
143. Id at 164, 583 P.2d at 725, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
144. Id at 167, 583 P.2d at 727, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
145. Id at 166, 583 P.2d at 726, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
146. Id at 166, 583 P.2d at 727, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
147. Id at 167, 583 P.2d at 727, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
148. Id
149. Id at 168, 583 P.2d at 728, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
150. See text and accompanying note 122 supra.
151. 22 Cal. 3d at 168, 583 P.2d at 728, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
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discussed below, it is clear that the California courts cannot consider an
issue that is not brought to them by litigants. It is hardly consistent
with the court's extolling of progressive and new law elsewhere in its
opinion for it to dissuade parties and their attorneys from attempting to
add new content, if that is the case here, to old legal vessels.
As for the "archaic" character of the California rule which the
court at times assumes permits this action for harm to a key corporate
employee, the court minces no words. Such an action, it states, is
"archaic and isolated in the context of the laws of the federal union." 152
What is more, in discussing this point, the court quotes Brainerd Cur-
rie, whose resolution of the true conflict it has rejected. Currie, says the
court, had observed in another context:
If the truth were known, it would probably be that [those few
states which have retained the archaic law of abatement have done
so] simply because of the proverbial inertia of legal institutions, and
that no real policy is involved.153
What the court neglects to state, however, is that in that very same
passage, Currie also stated:
The Arizona law is no doubt archaic and out of harmony with pre-
vailing legal thought. That is not our affair here. The business of
courts in conflict-of-laws cases is not to judge the policies of the
states, but to ascertain them and give them effect, so far as possible,
when there is a legitimate basis for effectuating them. We must
therefore do the best we can to formulate Arizona policy.154
If that is a proper analytical and philosophical approach to ascer-
taining the policies and interests of an "other state," which was the
situation in the last Currie excerpt quoted, and I have indicated my
belief that it is in the text herein, it is all the more so when a court
evaluates the policies and interests of the very state that has created the
court that is doing the evaluation.
No matter how archaic or how unused such a rule might be, the
citizens of a state have a right to expect their courts to apply that law in
cases involving multi-state elements as well as those that are entirely
domestic in character, if a California interest is present. Especially in
view of the consequences for California in not applying the liability
rule in Offshore Rental, as suggested by the court itself, namely the
effect upon "California's economy and tax revenues,"' 55 its citizens
152. Id
153. Currie, Survival ofActions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws,
in SELECTED EsSAYS, supra note 6, at 143.
154. Id at 143-44.
155. See text accompanying note 142 supra.
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could hardly be pleased by this misguided altruism of a unanimous
California Supreme Court.
Of course, if California law does not in fact allow a recovery by a
corporate employer for injuries to its key employee in an entirely do-
mestic setting, that would be another matter. In that event, the result
reached by Offshore Rental in a multi-state choice-of-law context
would be no different from what it would reach in an internal case;
and, in fact, Offshore Rental would merely represent the resolution of a
false conflict-namely one in which the Court applied the law of the
only state having an interest to be advanced by the application of its
law, Louisiana.
That this in fact might have been what happened is by no means
precluded by the opinion in Offshore Rental. Despite frequent state-
ments by the court that it is resolving a true conflict, there are other
expressions in the opinion suggesting that the court is not sure that it is
doing this in fact. For example, the court states that the right to recov-
ery is based on California Civil Code section 49 and dicta in California
cases.156 Elsewhere it says: "If we assumeforpurposes of analysis, that
section 49 does provide an employer with a cause of action for negli-
gent injury to a key employee, the laws of California and Louisiana are
directly in conflict." 157 At another point, the court uses language, al-
ready quoted, which states: "[Diespite the provisions of the antique
statute, no California court has heretofore squarely held that California
law provides an action for harm to business employees ... ,"158
It may be, therefore, that when the court has an occasion to con-
sider once more the resolution of a true conflict, it will look back upon
Offshore Rental and conclude that it had not resolved a true conflict
there after all. Among other things, such a conclusion would give the
court an opportunity to reexamine some of its Offshore Rental formula-
tions, which in light of such conclusion would then be dictum, about
how the true conflict is to be resolved. Perhaps the squeamishness
about resolving true conflicts by applying forum law will then be seen
to be unwarranted, and this part of Currie's analysis, which the Court
has in other respects heretofore accepted, will be seen as equally crucial
to the effectuation of the underlying aims of that analysis.
Finally, a word is in order about the last criterion applied by the
court in Offshore Rental in resolving what it, at times, characterizes as a
156. 22 Cal. 3d at 162, 583 P.2d at 724, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 870 (emphasis added).
157. Id at 163, 583 P.2d at 724, 148 Cal Rptr. at 870 (emphasis added).
158. Id at 168, 583 P.2d at 728, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
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true conflict: whether a state's policy "may easily be satisfied by some
means other than enforcement of the statute itself," as for example, by
insurance. This factor, it will be recalled, is part of the criterion re-
lated to the degree of intensity with which the contending states regard
their policies and interests (as is also true, for that matter, with the
"current status" of the respective laws discussed earlier). In this con-
nection, the court observes that the corporate plaintiff in Offshore
Rental "is a potential 'victim' peculiarly able to calculate [the risk of
injury to its key employee outside California] and to plan accordingly
...by purchasing key employee insurance."' 159
By contrast, the court states:
Although it is equally true that defendant is a business corpora-
tion able to calculate the risks of potential tort liability and to plan
accordingly, because defendant's operations in Louisiana presuma-
bly involved dealing with key employees of companies incorporated
in diverse states defendant would most reasonably have anticipated a
need for the protection of premises' liability insurance based on Lou-
isiana law. 1
60
Several observations can be made about this aspect of the court's
analysis. One is that, given the considerations discussed earlier in this
postscript, 6 1 it is by no means clear that the Louisiana courts them-
selves would deny liability in a multi-state situation if they determined
that the purpose of the nonliability rule was to require Louisiana cor-
porations to insure themselves, rather than to provide protection
against extended liability to Louisiana tortfeasors. Moreover, it would
seem that a Louisiana company that frequently dealt, as the court
states, with "key employees of companies incorporated in diverse
states" would not be unfairly surprised if it were held liable to those
companies under the laws of those states for the injuries it negligently
inflicted upon the key employees of such companies.
Thus, the court's conclusion that the burden of obtaining insur-
ance for the loss involved in Offshore Rental is most properly borne by
the plaintiff corporation 62 is debatable. To the extent that such a con-
clusion persuaded the court that California's interests were less in-
tensely implicated in the application of its law than were Louisiana's in
having its law applied, it once again produced a result that disserved
the plaintiff California corporation and the citizens of the state.
159. Id at 169, 583 P.2d at 728, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
160. Id at 169, 583 P.2d at 729, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
161. See text following note 137 supra.
162. 22 Cal. 3d at 169, 583 P.2d at 729, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
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